We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in homogeneous product industry, under efficient rationing, constant marginal cost until full capacity utilization, and identical technology across firms. We solve for the equilibrium and establish its uniqueness for capacity configurations in the mixed strategy region of the capacity space such that the capacities of the largest and smallest firm are sufficiently close.
Introduction
The analysis of price competition among capacity-constrained sellers of a homogeneous product (Bertrand-Edgeworth competition) has received considerable attention over recent years. Classic studies of duopoly under efficient rationing and constant (and identical across firms) unit cost below capacity may be found in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986) , the latter also establishing uniqueness of equilibrium in the mixed strategy region of the capacity space. More recently, De Francesco and Salvadori (2010) provided a complete characterization of equilibria under triopoly besides pointing out some general properties of equilibria under oligopoly. (For the triopoly, see also Hirata, 2009.) Concerning oligopoly, however, determination of mixed strategy equilibria when the price game does not possess pure strategy equilibria is only available for special cases. In this paper we provide a complete analysis of another, significant case, that of an almost symmetric oligopoly. This complements Vives (1986) , who determined the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in a symmetric oligopoly while leaving open the question of whether asymmetric mixed strategy equilibria also exist.
1 On the contrary, we prove that the equi-librium we find, which collapses to that of Vives when firms are equally sized, is unique. 2 
Preliminaries
There are n firms (1, 2, ..., n) producing an homogeneous commodity with given capacities. For each firm i, production cannot exceed its capacity k i and marginal cost is identical across the firms and constant until full capacity utilization is reached (with no loss of generality marginal cost is assumed to be 0). Let
) and P (x) = 0 for x D(0). The efficient rationing rule is assumed to hold; further, in the case of a price tie demand is shared among equally-priced firms in proportion to capacity, such that the residual demand accruing to firm i is
Denote by p c the competitive price. Clearly, 
Holding either condition, the firms get the competitive profit at any equilibrium; furthermore, (p c , ..., p c ) is the unique equilibrium when D(0) > K. Failing (1) and (2) , no pure strategy equilibrium exists whereas a mixed strategy equilibrium necessarily exists.
In the following, we denote by (φ 1 (p), ..., φ n (p)) = (φ i (p), φ −i (p)) an equilibrium profile of mixed strategies, where φ i (p) = Pr(p i < p) is the probability of firm i charging less than p. For brevity, we denote firm i's expected profit at mixed strategy equilibrium (
and denote by Π i (p, φ −i (p)) firm i's expected profit when it charges p against equilibrium strategy profile φ −i (p) on the part of its rivals. Let S i be the support of φ i (p) and p
m the supremum and the infimum of S i , respectively. More precisely, p ∈ S i when φ i (·) is increasing in p, i. e., when
The following Proposition lists some general properties of mixed strategy equilibrium to be used in the next section.
3. p m = max{ p, p} where p = Π * 1 /k 1 and p is the lower solution of equation
All these points were made for the duopoly by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) . For an extension to oligopoly, see De Francesco and Salvadori (2010) and the references contained therein.
Almost symmetric oligopoly
When a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist, p M < P (k 2 + ... + k n ). We define an almost symmetric oligopoly as a capacity configuration such that k 1 is so close to k n that p M P (k 1 + ... + k n−1 ). 
and distributions are
(c) p
ki kj for j ∈ {1, ..., i}, each i = 2, 3, ..., n.
Proof. (of Proposition 2)
(i) If #L < n, then on a neighbourhood of p m we would have Π i (p, φ −i (p)) = pk i for any i ∈ L, contrary to the constancy of Π i (p, φ −i (p)) in S i . 5 Therefore, Π * i = p m k i for any i.
(ii) Because of part (i), at any equilibrium,
implying that
over such a neighbourhood. It follows from (6) and (7) 
ks . Hence, at any equilibrium, equations (4.j) hold on a neighbouhood of p m . Since all S j are assumed to be connected, equations (4.j) hold up to p = p (n) M , namely, the price equating to 1 the RHS of equation (4.n) (and any equation (4.j) such that k j = k n ). Let h be the number of firms with capacity k n . Since all S j are assumed to be connected there exists a right neighbourhood of p
pk j for any j ∈ {1, ..., n − h} over such a neighbourhood: hence φ j (p) = Remark (b) ensures that for each j, φ
M ). It must also be checked that, for any j such that p
This is so if and only if
, which holds true since the expression in each square bracket is positive. 5 This property of mixed strategy equilibria in the given circumstances had already been found by Hirata (2009, p. 7).
(p 
is somewhere increasing over that range, we obtain that k h φ
• . This leads to the following contradiction, Π 1 (p, φ
7 Thus no support can have a gap and hence no other equilibrium exists.
To sum up, Proposition 2 determines the equilibrium and establishes its uniqueness in the subset of the mixed strategy region of the capacity space where p M P (k 1 + ... + k n−1 ).
8 It should be emphasized that this is a sufficient condition for uniqueness: the equilibrium is still unique in other (though not all) subsets.
9 This can be seen most simply by showing that the equilibrium is characterized as in Proposition 2 when inequality p M P (k 1 + ... + k n−1 ) is slightly relaxed. Suppose that p m P (k 1 + ... + k n−1 ). Then, by reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 2, at any equilibrium #L = n and equations 6 The possibility of equilibria with gaps cannot be ignored. De Francesco and Salvadori (2010) find conditions under which the support of the equilibrium strategy of one firm does have a gap.
7 Indeed, dΠ 1 /dp
positive since D(p) − P j =1 k j + pD ′ (p) > 0. 8 A condition that is met, for example, when D(p) = 20 − p, n = 4, k 1 = 6, k 2 = 5, k 3 = 3, and k 4 = 2.
9 The whole subset of the mixed strategy region where equilibrium is unique has been found, for the triopoly, by De Francesco and Salvadori (2010); in the remaining subset the equilibrium is indeterminate as far as the distributions of smaller firms are concerned.
